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THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
By

QUINCY WRIGHT*

1. OBJECTS OF THE CONFERENCE.

T

HE objects of the international conference which sat in Washington from November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922, were
set forth in President Harding's formal invitation to Great
Britain, France, Italy and Japan of August 11, 1921:1
"Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden
too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures
are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance
of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the
reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements
in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater
part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity;
and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only
without economic justification but is a constant menace to the
peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation.
Yet there would seem to he no ground to expect the halting of
these increasing outlays unless the powers most largely concerned
find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation.
The time is believed to be opportune for these powers to approach
this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the question of naval armament
may naturally have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament to the end that all
practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration.
It may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by' which
in the interest of humanity the use of new agencies of warfare
may be suitably controlled.
"It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance
of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace,
and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove
causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
Professor Wright was technical adviser to the Navy Department on

questions pertaining to the conference. Ed.
"On July IO, 1921, the Department of State announced that these

powers had been "approached with informal but definite inquiries" on
the subject.
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to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this
Government that through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution
of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned- importance
at this time, that is, such common understanding with respect to
matters which have been and are of international concern as may
serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.
"It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define
the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East,
but rather to leave this to be' the subject of suggestions, to be exchanged before the meeting of the conference, in the expectation
that the spirit of friendship and cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy, will govern
the final decision."
After acceptance of this invitation by the five powers and of
an invitation including merely the last two paragraphs by China,
(subsequently by Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal also') these
objects were rendered more concrete by publication of the following agenda on September 21, 1921:'
Limitation of Armament
Limitation of naval armament, under which shall be discussed
(a) Basis of limitation.
(b) Extent.
(c) Fulfillment.
Two. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
Three. Limitation of land armament.
Pacific and FarEastern Questions
One. Questions relating to China.
First: Principles to be applied.
Second: Application.
Subjects: (a) Territorial integrity.
(b) Administrative integrity.
(c) Open door,---equality of commercial and
industrial opportunity.
One.

'Invitations to these three powers were extended on October 4,

1921..

"In a note of July 26, i921, prior to her formal invitation to the con-

ference, Japan had suggested that introduction on the agenda of "prob-

lems such as are of sole concern to certain particular powers or such

matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts should be scrtipul-

ously avoided." In a note formally accepting the American invitation
on August 24, Japan hoped that the conference would be "arranged in
harmony with the suggestion made in the memorandum of the Japanese

'Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July

26, 192I."
The Chino-Japanese
controversy over Shantung, the twenty-one demands treaty of 1915, and
the American Japanese controversy over Yap and the mandates seemed

to fall under these heads, so were not brought before the conference,
though they were in fact settled by special negotiations conducted in
Washington at the same time, with exception of the second.
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(d) Concessions, monopolies or preferential
economic privileges.
(e) Development of railways, including plans
relating to Chinese Eastern Raihvay.
(f) Preferential railroad rates.
(g) Status of existing commitments.
Two. Siberia. (similar headings.)
Three. Mandated Islands. (unless questions earlier settled.)
Electrical Communications in the Pacific.
Under the heading of "Status of existing commitments" it is
expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to
reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of
rights may hereafter be asserted.
In addition however to the two major problems here indicated,
another was in the back of every one's mind, suggested by the
platform on which President Harding had been elected.
"The Republican party stands for agreement among the nations
to preserve the peace of the world. We believe that such an international association must be based upon international justice,
and must provide methods- which shall maintain the rule of public
right by the development of law and the decision of impartial
courts, and which shall secure instant and general international
conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action,
so that the nations pledged to do and insist upon what is just and
fair may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of
war."
This object came to the surface after the conference had begun through President Harding's announcement to a group of
newspaper men on November 25 that the administration would
"set on foot a movement to bring out of the armament conference
a system of similar but broader annual conferences to deal with
the troubles of the world."
Thus the objects of the conference extended to three distinct
topics, Limitation of Armamient, Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, Association of Nations.
2. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE.
The conference consisted of plenary sessions and committees.
The plenary sessions were formal occasions attended by all the
delegates, in which announcement was made of programs for
discussion or agreements reached. They were not intended for
negotiation but for declaration. They were held in Continental
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Memorial Hall, a handsome marble building on 17th street erected
by the Daughters of the American Revolution and were open
to members of the Senate and House of Representatives, representatives of the press and such of the public as had cards of
admission from the State department.
The delegates sat at a "U" shaped green covered table with
Mr. Hughes as chairman at the head of the "U". The remaining
American delegates sat at his right, the British at his left and then
in regular alternation the French, Italian and Japanese delegations. Thus an alphabetic order was followed as is customary
in such gatherings. The powers attending merely the Far Eastern
but not the Limitation of Armament Conference sat at the ends
of the "U" in a similar order, Belgium, China, Netherlands, Portugal. In the center of the "U" sat the secretary of the conference and the efficient interpreter, M. Camerlynck, ready to repeat
instantly every English speech in French and vice versa, for both
these languages were official in the conference. Back of the delegates sat their technical experts. Since the auditorium seated
only about 1200" persons, subtraction of the space occupied by
delegates, experts, senators, representatives and the press left a
remainder of forty seats to rotate among those of the public who
would like to attend.
The real work of negotiation was conducted by committees.
There was a committee of the whole on armaments with five powers represented and a committee of the whole on the Far East and
Pacific with nine powers represented. These appointed many
subcommittees, some of delegates, some of experts, and some
mixed. Committee or subcommittee meetings went on almost continuously in the Pan-American building next door to Continental
Memorial Hall and closely guarded by marines with fixed bayonets.
The delegations were assisted by technical experts, of which
Japan had the most. The American delegation was also assisted by
an "advisory committee" selected by, the president so as to represent prominent organizations of the country, and designed to form
a liaison between the conference and the public.
Publicity was handled in the manner customary with international conferences. Plenary sessions were public, committee and
subcommittee meetings were private. The public gained only such
information of the latter as was given out in communiques pre.
pared for the press by the committee itself or in press interviews

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

by plenipotentiary delegates. The latter method gave ground for
occasional protest by certain delegations who felt that confidential
discussions had been prematurely published. News of committee
happenings sometimes came to Washington via London, Paris or
Tokyo where it had leaked out through the foreign offices of those
countries. Finally the fertile imaginations of newspaper correspondents was a source for filling news columns if not always for
distributing accurate information. Stories of violent disagreement in committee meetings, one of which occasioned an antiFrench riot in an Italian town, had to be officially denied by the
plenipotentiaries, reputed to have participated. Although this type
of rumor was something of an embarrassment, on the whole the
progress of the conference endorsed the experience gained at
Versailles and in the League of Nations, that negotiations can be
most satisfactorily conducted withdrawn from the glare of public
opinion but that agreements should be published as soon as
reached.
It seems probable that the United States Senate will discuss
the Washington treaties in open session as they did the treaty of
Versailles. To facilitate this discussion the president in submitting the treaties to the Senate on February 10, 1922, accompanied
them with complete minutes of both plenary session and committee
meetings and a copy of the official report of the American delegation.
3. NEGOTIATIONS.

"Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and
none of war!' Thus President Harding struck the keynote of
the conference at its opening meeting, and in spite of much haggling for national advantage in committee meetings, the pitch was
not wholly lost through the seven plenary sessions which marked
the progress of negotiations.
On the opening session, November 12, 1921, after President
Harding's address of welcome, Secretary of State Hughes was
elected chairman and surprised the conference and the world by
laying down a concrete program for the limitation of naval armaments. On November 14 a session was held in which Mr. Balfour
for Great Britain, Premier Briand for France, Admiral Baron
Kato for Japan and Senator Schanzer for Italy accepted the American proposal "in principle."
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Committee negotiations upon the details of this proposal began
at once as also upon the Far Eastern problems, but before any
conclusions had been reached another plenary session was held,
on November 21, to afford Premier Briand the opportunity to say
that France was unwilling to discuss an agreement for the limitation of land armament until Germany was "morally" as well as
"physically" disarmed. He cited passages from General Ludendorff's recent book to prove that this happy state had not been
reached. Delegates of the other powers diplomatically voiced
their disappointment, Senator Schanzer of Italy expressing the
hope, doomed to disappointment, that the land armament item on
the agenda would not be abandoned.
After three sessionless weeks filled with committee negotiations
over the Japanese demand for a 10, 10, 7 naval ratio instead of
the 5, 5, 3 ratio proposed in the American plan, the conference
again sat in plenary session on December 10. Previous to the
meeting, information had reached America from foreign capitals
that a Pacific alliance was being negotiated and at this meeting
Senator Lodge of the American delegation presented the fourpower Pacific Pact, which he noted covered islands "so diverse
that we might describe them in the words of Browning as the
'Sprinkled isles,
Lily on lily that o'erlace the sea--'"
islands ranging in size from "Australia, continental in magnitude
to atolls where there are no dwellers but the builders of coral
reefs," islands upon which "still shines the glamour of some of
the stories of Melville and the writings of Robert Louis Stevenson." Unfortunately he neglected to refer to the home islands
of Japan which the committee, had agreed were included, thu5
misleading President Harding who offered a contrary interpretation in a press statement of December 20. This was, however,
withdrawn six hours later with the comment that the president
had "no objections to the construction" which the delegates had
agreed upon. It appears that the inclusion of the Japanese Home
Islands had been originally insisted upon by Great Britain as a
sop to the pride of Australia and New Zealand which were also
included. The attitude of the United States Senate, however,
seemed to jeopardize the whole agreement and as Japan was not
averse, a subsequent resolution expressly excluded her home islands.
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The next plenary session was held on February* 1, the seven
weeks' interim being filled with difficult committee negotiations.
The United States, Great Britain and Japan announced substantial agreement upon the American naval limitation program on
December 15, the most important modification being the concession to Japan, whereby she was to retain the "Mutsu," which was
to have been scrapped. This was a new vessel built by popular subscription and of sentimental importance. Great Britain and the
United States were in consequence to complete two new Post-Juiland battleships. More older vessels were to be scrapped thus
leaving the total tonnage and the ratios substantially as
in the original proposal.
More formidable difficulties in
the naval treaty were presented by the French demand
for the privilege of building ten Post-Jutland battleships
of 35,000 tons each, only withdrawn after Mr. Hughes
had cabled Premier Briand, who had returned to France,
that insistence upon this demand would wreck the treaty.
France, however, accepted the 1.75 ratio for capital ships, with
the understanding that she be allowed a larger ratio of "defensive ships" in which category she included submarines. In spite
of the British demand for total abolition of submarines," and the
American desire to limit their number to 60,000 tons for United
States and Great Britain with tonnage on the adopted capital ship
ratios for the others, France was obdurate. With the failure of
submarine limitation, efforts to limit the total tonnage of surface
auxiliaries, which certain powers thought necessary to combat
them, also failed and the conference had to be content with the
Root resolution declaring submarine use against merchantmen
piracy and limiting the size of naval fighting auxiliaries except
air craft carriers to 10,000 tons. Vessels of larger tonnage were
to be regarded as capital ships. Perhaps the warmest debates of
the conference occurred on the submarine issue, since Great Britain regarded the French demand as a menace to her safety.
Discussion of the Chinese problem, was begun by the presentation on November 16 of ten points by Mr. Sze. These were
abandoned and four general principles formulated by Mr. Root
and restating the Hay Open Door notes of 1899 and 1900 were

'This demand was in accordance with British traditions. Earl St.
Vincent of the British Admiralty said to Robert Fulton, when the latter
presented plans for a submarine in 18o4: "It is a mode of war which
we who command the seas do not want, and which if successful would
deprive us of it." (Bywater, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1922, 129: 267).
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adopted. Detailed application of these principles proved difficult
and several Chinese technical experts resigned in disgust. In
fact all progress threatened at times to be held up by the failure
of China and Japan to agree in their special conversations on
Shantung begun at Washington on December 1 through the good
offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour.
These negotiations finally succeeded, and in the plenary session of February 1, the Shantung treaty was published together
with the five power naval limitation treaty, the five power treaty
restricting the use of submarines and poison gases, and a number
of resolutions on the Far East which had been previously adopted
in committee.
A session of February 4 published two nine power treaties
on China, one attempting to assure the territorial and administrative integrity of China and the open door, the other providing
for Chinese customs administration. At the final meeting February 6, the five treaties were formally signed and President
Harding made a concluding address.
Thus the work of the conference is embodied in five treaties
explained and amplified by fourteen resolutions and ten unilateral declarations. The treaties -with the resolutions directly pertinent thereto, were presented to the United States Senate by
President Harding in person on February 10, with the comment:
"All the treaties submitted for your approval have such important relationship, one to another, that, though not interdependent, they are the covenants of harmony, of assurance, of conviction, of conscience, and of unanimity.

.

.

. I submit to the

Senate that if we can nof join in making effective these covenants
for peace, we shall discredit the influence of the republic, render
future efforts futile or unlikely, and write discouragement where
today the world is ready to acclaim new hope."
In addition to the work of the conference, three treaties, relating to Shantung, Yap and Pacific cables have been negotiated
at Washington concurrently with the conference.
These various treaties, resolutions and declarations embody
achievements, more or less complete in the three fields which the
conference had before it. We may therefore consider in succession its results as to Limitation of Armament, Far Eastern and
Pacific Questions, and an Association of Nations.
4. LImiTATIoN OF ARMAMENT.
Efforts to limit armament by international agreement did not
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.begin in recent years.! A treaty to this effect is said to have been
made in the Chinese Age of Confusion (6th Century B. C.). In
1766 Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, suggested an army
limitation agreement to Frederick the Great and in 1787 France
and England actually signed a treaty reducing navies. Army limitation agreements were proposed by Alexander I of Russia
(1816), Louis Phillippe of France (1831), the Italian General
Garibaldi (1860), Richard Cobden of the British House of Commons (1861), and Napoleon III of France on several occasions
(1863, 1867, 1870). More important, however, was the proposal
of Czar Nicholas II. The Mouravieff circular of August 12, 1898,
calling the First Hague Conference, issued under his authority,
suggests President Harding's invitation of August 11, 1921:
"The ever-increasing financial charges strike and paralyze
public prosperity at its source; the intellectual and physical
strength of the nations, their labor and capital, are for the most
part diverted from their natural application and unproductively
consumed; hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring terrible
engines of destruction, which though today regarded as the last
word of science are destined to-morrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National
culture, economic progress, and the production of wealth are either
paralyzed or perverted in their development.
"Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each. power increase, so do they less and less attain the object aimed at by the
governments. Economic crises, due in great part to the system of
amassing armaments to the point of exhaustion, and the continual danger which lies in this accumulation of war material, are
transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden
which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It
appears evident, then, that if this state of affairs be prolonged,
it will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to
avert, and the impending horrors of which are fearful to every
human thought.
"In checking these increasing armaments and in seeking the
means of averting the calamities which threaten the entire world
lies the supreme duty today resting upon all States.
"Imbued with this idea, his majesty has been pleased to command me to propose to all the governments which have accred'For a history of efforts to limit armaments see Wehberg, Limitation
of Armaments, Washington, 1921, pp. 5-6, translated from French edition,
1914; the same authors more exhaustive, Die Internationale Beschrinkung
der Riistungen, Stuttgart und Berlin, .1919, pp. 3-9; Fried, Hendbuch der
Friedensbewegung, Berlin and Leipzig, 1913, 2:3-56; and Wright, Limitation of Armament, Institute of International Education, Syllabus No.
XII, November, 192.
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ited representatives at the imperial court the holding of a conference to consider this grave problem."
The First Hague Conference which met in response to this
call in the summer of 1899 failed to limit armaments as did its
successor in 1907. Germany was the stumbling block, as she was
in the numerous overtures for a naval holiday made by England
from 1910 to the outbreak of the world war. This obstacle was,
however, removed by the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Sevres which provided for the effective disarmament of the Central Powers, "in order to render possible the
institution of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations."
The members of the League of Nations had, in the covenant,
recognized "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction
of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national
safety and the enforcement by common action of international
obligations." In the two assemblies of the League the armament
question had received thorough consideration with the conclusion
that effective action toward limitation would be impossible .without cooperation of the United States who was taking the lead in
naval building.
The United States Congress, however, by the Hensley amendment to the large naval appropriation act of 1916 had declared
that "it looks with apprehension and disfavor upon a general increase of armament throughout the world, but it realizes that no
single nation can disarm, and that without a common agreement
upon the subject every considerable power must maintain a relative standing in military strength." Consequently it had authorized the president to call a conference "not later than the close of
the war in Europe" to "formulate a plan for a court of arbitration
or 'other tribunal" and to "consider the question of disarmament,"
and to suspend the naval program provided in the act, in case
the results of such conference should "render unnecessary the
maintenance of competitive armaments."
Thus the time was ripe for agreement on the subject. In his
speech of July 22, 1920, accepting the republican nomination for
president, Mr. Harding said he could "hear in the call of conscience an insistent voice for the largely reduced armaments
through the world" and a resolution introduced in the Senate by
Mr. Boraa was passed as an amendment to the Naval Appropriation act of July 12, 1921. This amendment
"Authorized and requested" the president "to invite the Gov-
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ernments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to
a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly
entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval
expenditures and building programs of each of said governments,
to wit the United States, Great Britain and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an
extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agreemeit is to be reported to the respective governments for approval."
Two days before passage of this amendment, however, President
Harding announced that he had already approached the powers
informally with reference to a conference of broader scope and
more extended membership. These informal approaches lead to
the formal invitations of August 11.
The Washington treaties on naval armament limitation are
based on four general principles laid down in Mr. Hughes's original proposal:
"(a) The elimination of all capital ship building programs,
either actual or projected.
(b) Further reduction through scrapping of certain of the
older ships.
(c) That regard should be had to the existing naval strength
of the conferring powers.
(d) The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of
strength of navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed."
In detail they provide for a discontinuance of all capital ship
building for ten years, certain replacement being allowed France
and Italy after 1927. Capital ships include every "vessel of war,
not an air craft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons
standard displacement or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches."
Existing capital ships are to be scrapped so as to leave the United
States 18 (525,850 tons), Great Britain 20 (558,980 tons), Japan 10, (301,320 tons), France 10, (221,170 tons), Italy 10,
(182,800 tons). After 1931 ships ov.er 20 years old may be replaced so as to maintain ratios of 525, 525, 315, 175, 175 among
the five powers, no vessel being over 35,000 tons. The treaty i3
to be effective for fifteen years and to continue after that unless
denounced with two years' notice. It may be suspended in time
of war with exception of the articles relating to scrapped vessels.
Aircraft carriers are limited with regard both to total tonnage and individual tonnage, but air craft themselves are not
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limited. Submarines and fighting surface auxiliaries may not
exceed 10,000 tons displacement or carry guns of over 8 inches,
but there is no limitation in their total tonnage. Merchant vessels
may not be prepared for military use in time of peace except to
stiffen decks for guns, of not over six inches.
No limitation is placed on land forces or armament. The
status quo "with regard to fortifications and naval bases" is to
be maintained in the American, British and Japanese insular possessions in the Pacific except Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, the
Japanese home islands, and the islands near the American continent exclusive of the Aleutians.
Rules were adopted declaring the use of submarines against
merchant vessels to be piracy and prohibiting the use of noxious
and poisonous gases, and a resolution urged the calling of a conference to consider laws of war.
These armament limitation provisions go an enormous step
beyond all previous treaties on the subject. They should result
in a genuine saving of money.through the discontinuance of capital ship programs. "This treaty" said Mr. Hughes in the plenary
session of February 1, "ends, absolutely ends, the race in competitive armament." Without minimizing the achievements of
-the conference it is well to recall that the problems of land armaments, submarines, naval vessels under 10,000 tons and air craft
remain. Competition in these types of armament is still possible
without violation of the treaty. The importance of this is emphasized through the opinion of many professional naval men that,
even in the absence of international agreement, future navies
would have been composed of smaller vessels, because of the increasing difficulty of properly defending super-dreadnaughts
from submarines and aircraft.
While the illegitimate use of submarines and the use of poison
gases were prohibited it is well to recall that the same prohibitions were recognized under customary international law and the
Hague Conventions on August 2, 1914. Too much should not be
expected of rules of warfare. Unless framed so that their observance serves the mtilitary aims of belligerents better than their
violation, they will be of remedial rather than preventive value.
They will give the victor a ground of action but will not mitigate
the horrors of war.
"We may grant, "said Mr. Root in presenting the treaty, "that
rules limiting the use of implements of war made between diplo-
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mats will be violated in the stress of conflict. We may grant that
the most solemn obligation assumed by governments in respect of
the use of implements of war will be violated in the stress of conflict, but beyond diplomatists and beyond governments there rests
the public opinion of the civilized world, and the public opinion of
the world can punish."
5.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC QUESTIONS.

International conferences have occasionally been called to consider general principles or methods for conducting international
relationships. Of this character were the Geneva Conferences on
the Red Cross (1864, 1906), the St. Petersburg and Brussels
Conferences on land warfare (1868, 1872), the Hague Peace
Conferences, (1899, 1907) and the London Naval Conference
(1909).
Of a somewhat different character are international conferences called to settle particular political problems or controversies. These have usually followed wars as did the Congresses of
Westphalia (1648,), Utrecht (1715), Vienna (1815), Paris
(1856), Berlin (1878), and Versailles (1919). Sometimes, however, they have been called in time of peace to prevent war. Examples may be found in the various African conferences participated in by the European powers and the United States at Berlin
(1885), Brussels (1890), and Algeciras (1906). Often, it is
true, this type of conference establishes general principles, but its
prime object is to settle an immediate political problem.
The Washington Conference combined both types. The five
power negotiations on limitation of armament were of the first,
the nine power negotiations on Far East and Pacific Questions
were of the second type. The latter was concerned primarily with
China, but Pacific Islands and Siberia were also on the agenda.
The absence of Russia from the conference precluded action
on the latter beyond a resolution taking cognizance of the Japanese declaration of intention eventually to withdraw its troops from
Siberia and northern Saghalien. No time was stated.
On Pacific Islands the fortification status quo provision of
the naval limitation treaty has been referred to. More important
is the four-power pact by which the United States, Great Britain,
France and Japan "agree as between themselves, to respect their
rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean" and "if the said rights
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are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power" to
"communicate with one afiother fully and frankly in order to
arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to
be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." A subsequently adopted resolution excludes
the Japanese home islands from the treaty. Attached resolutions
exclude domestic questions from the controversies which may be
a subject of discussion under article 1, and reserve the privilege
to the United States to negotiate with reference to mandated islands which are declared within the scope of the treaty. The
agreement is to continue for ten years and more unless denounced
with a year's notice. Its dual object, from the American standpoint, of superseding the Anglo-Japanese alliance and protecting
the Phillippines seems to have been achieved, the first expressly.
The treaty is between only four powers and is confined to insular
possessions and dominions in the Pacific but in other respects it
seems to bear a close resemblance to article X of the League of
Nations Covenant by which
"The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing
political independence of all members of the league. In case of any
such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."
Mr. Lodge, however, in presenting the four power pact to the
Conference on December 10 distinguished it from this article,
and in offering the treaties to the Senate on February 10, President Harding said:
"There is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no
written or moral obligation to join in defense, no expressed or
implied commitment to arrive at any agreement except in accordance with our constitutional methods. It is easy to believe,
however, that such a conference of the four powers is a moral
warning that an aggressive nation, giving affront to the four great
powers ready to focus world opinion. on a given controversy,
would be embarking on a hazardous enterprise."
This statement, however, leaves some doubt as to the President's interpretation of the pact. If the clauses of the first sentence are separable and the parties are under "no written or
moral obligation to join in defense" it is difficult to see why an
aggressive enterprise would be any more "hazardous" with the
treaty than without it. If on the other hand, the final qualification applies to all the preceding clauses, the president seems to
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imply that there is a "commitment to armed force" provided "our
constitutional methods" are followed.'
Closely connected with this treaty are the negotiations over the
island of Yap, between the United States and Japan, conducted
independently of, but concurrently with, the conference. These
began in the summer of 1921 and resulted in a treaty signed
February 11, 1922. By this treaty the United States recognizes
the Japanese mandate in Yap under the League of Nations and
Japan agrees to accord the United States full rights in all that
relates to cables on the island. The United States, Great Britain,
France, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands have also practically
concluded a negotiation dividing the former German Pacific
cables between the United States, Japan and the Netherlands.
Since the first opium war and the treaty of Nanking (1842)
Chinese sovereignty has suffered progressive impairments. These
impairments extended to customs autonomy and jurisdiction over
resident aliens before the Chino-Japanese war- of 1895. Soon
after the European acquisitions of leaseholds and spheres of interest jeopardized Chinese territorial and administrative integrity
while the privileges of the favored powers in these spheres
threatened to deprive other powers, most notably the United
Statds, of all share in the economic development of China. Finally the Japanese policy which began to develop in Manchuria aiter the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, seriously menaced the political independence of China. This policy culminated in the 21 demands, the treaty of May, 1915, based thereon, whereby China
agreed to recognize any Japanese settlement with Germany, and
the treaty of Versailles transferring former German rights to
Japan. It should be noted, however, that Japan had declared an
intention to return some of these rights to China as soon as the
Chinese government, divided and insecure since the revolution of
1911, gave signs of stability. The Hay open door notes of 1899 and
1900, the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908 and the LansingIshii agreement of 1917, though all affirming the territorial integrity, the administrative entity of China and the open door had
been of little material assistance to that power, while the last, by
recognizing that "territorial propinquity" creates special interests
actually strengthened Japan's position.
'Although the latter interpretation is more in accordance with the
language of the pact and of the President's statement, the former is in
accord with his language earlier in the message. "The four-power
treaty contains no war commitment"
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The Washington treaties with their appended resolutions go
immeasurably beyond earlier agreements. The tariff treaty does
not restore Chinese tariff autonomy but does provide for periodic
revisions to assure China 5 per cent on imports, in exchange for
which China agrees to abolish liken or domestic sales taxes, and
to fulfill existing treaties with respect to taxation.
The more important Chinese treaty begins by reiteration of
general principles in respect to China formulated by Mr. Root
and resembling the Hay statements. The powers other than
China agree:
"1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
"2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity
to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and
stable government.
"3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the
commerce and industry of all nations through the territory of
China.
"4. To refrain from taking advantages of conditions in China
in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge
the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from
countenancing action inimical to the security of such states."
The powers agree to refrain from making treaties, agreements,
arrangements or understandings "either with one another or individually or collectively with any other power or powers which
would infringe or impair" these principles. A more substantial
guarantee is given to the last two principles through the creation
of an international board of reference in China to investigate and
report whether future concessions in China are in accord with the
open door. The original proposal to give the board authority to
consider past as well as future concessions failed of acceptance,
though a resolution provided that past concessions be published.
China herself agrees not to permit unfair discrimination in economic matters, particularly railways.
Various agreements, resolutions, and declarations connected
with the treaty aim to give concrete application to the first two
of the Root principles. Some of the resolutions are considered
within the scope of executive agreements and so will not be submitted to the Senate for ratification. The Shantung treaty between China and Japan greatly assists toward restoring the territorial integrity of China. Japan agrees to restore the leased
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port of Kiau Chau and to sell back the Tsing-Tao-Tsinanfu railway for Chinese Treasury notes redeemable in fifteen years or at
Chinese option in five years. Japan is to have a traffic manager
and chief accountant under a Chinese managing director until payment is complete. Following announcement of this treaty Mr.
Balfour declared the British willingness to restore her leased port
of Wei-Hai-Wei to China. France indicated a willingness to
negotiate for the restoration of Kvang-chow. If these negotiations are successful the Japanese lease of Port Arthur and part
of the Liaotung Peninsula and the British lease of Kow'Loon near
Hong Kong would alone remain. China declared her intention
to make no more leases. Aside from the two leases, the British
island of Hong Kong, the Portugese port of Macao and the Japanese island of Formosa and privileges in Manchuria remain as
substractions from the territorial integrity of China as she existed before contact with Europe.
The administrative integrity of China gained through resolutions providing for withdrawal of foreign postoffices by January,
1923, and of unauthorized foreign radio stations; for a commisson to report on the practicability of removing exterritorial jurisdiction, and for a consultation looking toward the removal of foreign troops in China. In the Shantung treaty Japan agreed to
withdraw troops from that area and the powers requested China
to reduce her military forces. Japan also declared her willingness to abandon group five of the twenty-one demands of 1915
which China bad never accepted.
Though China has by no means regained full territorial and
administrative integrity, yet substantial steps in this direction
have been taken. The United States will have less cause to worry
about the Phillippines, agreement has been reached on the vexing
problems of Yap and the Pacific cables, and the Anglo-Japanese
alliance has been superseded. Made in 1902 against Russia, renewed in 1905 and 1911 against Germany it seemed to have no
objective unless the United States in 1921. Yet to denounce it
after the loyal observance of Japan during the World War woull
hardly comport with British honor. The addition of France and
the United States seemed the easiest way out and this was achieved
by the four power pact.
6. ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS.
The problem of an association of nations though not on the
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agenda, lay in the background of the conference. An international conference is certain to end with its purposes only partly
achieved and so seeks to perpetuate itself. Thus in his instructions to the American delegates at the second Hague Conference,
Mr. Root, then Secretary of State, wrote:
"After reasonable discussion, if no agreement is reached, it
is better to lay the subject aside, or refer it to some future conference in the hope that intermediate consideration may dispose of
the objections. . . The immediate results of such a conference
must always be limited to a small part of the field which the more
sanguine have hoped to see covered, but each successive conference will make the positions reached in the preceding conference
its point of departure, and will bring to the consideration of
further advances toward international agreement opinions affected by the acceptance and application of the previous agreements. Each conference will inevitably make further progress,
and, by successive steps, results may be accomplished which have
formerly appeared impossible."
Consequently he suggested further conferences and a recommendation to this effect was adopted.
However, the problem of an association of nations was emphasized in the Washington Conference because of the struggle
in the United States over the League of Nations. President Harding and Senator Lodge had voted for the league with reservations while Senator Underwood had voted for it without reservations. Secretary Hughes and Mr. Root had openly favored the
league in public speeches and had signed a letter on October 14,
1920, with twenty-nine other prominent republicans urging the
election of President Harding as the shortest route to American
entry into the league. The republican platform subsequently
adopted contained a clause drafted by Mr. Root favoring an association of nations, but without assuming a definite position on the
league. In an address before the American Society of International Law on April 27, 1921, Mr. Root had explained this as
capable of fulfillment by American entry into the league.
"It is apparent" he said, after quoting the Republican platform
article, "that the attitude of the league and the attitude of America
toward this subject do not differ in substance, however much they
may differ as to the specific modes of effectuating the common
purpose. .

..

"There remain the hindrances of differing forms and methods
favored by the nations within and the nations without the existing
league. But the idea that by agreeing at this time to a formula
the nations can forever after be united in preventing war by mal-I

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

ing war seems practically to have been abandoned; and the remaining differences are not of substance and ought not to prevent
the general desire of the civilized world from giving permanent
form to institutions to prevent further war. In the long run, from
the'standpoint of the international lawyer, it does not much matter
whether the substance of such institutions is reached by amending
an existing agreement or by making a new agreement."
President Harding, however, interpreted the republican platform
otherwise and in his message of.April 12, 1921, held his election
to the presidency to be a rejection of the league by the United
States. But in making this statement he referred to
"the American aspiration" for "an association of nations based
upon the application of justice dnd right, binding us in conference
and cooperation for the prevention of war and pointing the way to
a higher civilization and international fraternity in which all the
world might share. In the national referendum to which I have
adverted, we pledged our efforts towards such an association, and
the pledge will be faithfully kept."
All of the powers in the Washington Conference except the
United States were members of the league and most of the delegates, including Messrs. Balfour, Viviani, Schanzer, Koo, and
Karnebeek had taken a prominent part in its work, notably in the
discussions of armament limitation at the second assembly of'the
league, which ended a few weeks before the Washington Conference met. Nothing, however, was said about the league in the
conference deliberations, though the United States recognized
that organization through recognition of the Japanese mandates
under it in the Yap treaty negotiated at the same time.
On November 25, President Harding suggested to group of
newspaper men that the limitation of armament conference might
well furnish a precedent for future conferences, thus creating a
loose association of nations and in his concluding address on February 6.he said:
"Since this conference of nations has pointed with unanimity
to the way of peace today, like conferences in the future, under
appropriate conditions and with aims both well conceived and
definite, may illumine the highways and byways of human activity.
The torches of understanding have been lighted, and they ought
to glow and encircle the globe."
Though no association is formally referred to in the treaties,
numerous clauses authorize the calling of future conferences or
the establishment of commissions. The functions of these bodies
vary from political and administrative to quasi-judicial, in char-
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acter. Thus the United States is to arrange for a conference in
eight years to revise the naval limitation agreement. Othier powers may call such a conference in emergency and one must be
called after a war which has suspended a treaty. A conference
to revise the rules of war is authorized, as is one to revise the
Chinese customs tariff. A commission is appointed to consider
the question of exterritoriality in China and by the four-power
pact the powers agree to meet in joint conference if a question
arises over Pacific possessions. Finally a board of reference to
consider questions under the open door agreement is provided
for.
These provisions for future conference are not in any sense
a substitute for the League of Nations with its permanent secretariat, periodical council and assembly, administrative commissions
and permanent court of international justice. The experience of
Washington has undoubtedly convinced European statesmen of
the utility of the league and of its permanence, whether or not the
United States elects to enter it. The league has greeted the efforts at Washington as helpful cooperation in its own work,
but sees no association of nations which could possibly become a
rival.
"The American people," writes Mr. Frank H. Simonds, "will
have to make up their minds to the fact that in spite of the Washington Conference, or on account of it, the European nations
which have been represented here and the European nations which
were not represented have not been shaken in their adherence tc
the Geneva organization and that the French, the Dutch, and not
impossibly even the English, have seen in the circumstances of
the Washington Conference reasons for having increased, rather
than diminished, respect and faith in and for the League of Nations."
Thus the Washington Conference has brought both the United
States and Europe to an increased understanding of the value
and necessity of international organization. It has begun to liquidate the political bankruptcy into which the world was plunged
in 1920, through the exigencies of American party politics. In his
eulogy of the unknown soldier on armistice day President Harding had a vision of a united world:
"His patriotism was none less if he craved more than triumph
of country; rather it was greater if he hoped for a victory for all
human kind."
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The method of achievement he tried to express in his address
terminating the conference:
"I once believed in armed preparedness. I advocated it. But
I have come now to believe there is better preparedness in a public
mind and a world opinion made ready to grant justice precisely
as it exacts it. And justice is better served in conferences of people than in conflicts of arms."

